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Overview—This paper looks at primary care case
management (PCCM) as a tool that states have used to
manage the delivery of care to their Medicaid popula-
tions, an alternative to contracting with commercial
managed care plans. PCCM has proved a flexible
means of advancing state policy goals, including
quality improvement, disease management, and cover-
age of special-needs populations. The paper considers
provider and beneficiary perspectives on PCCM as well
as state agency objectives and accomplishments.
Finally, it raises the question of adapting the PCCM
model for Medicare. Speakers at the accompanying
Forum session will expand on these topics.
While enrollment in Medicare+Choice, Medicare’s
managed care program, has not borne out the expectations
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the transition of
Medicaid programs to managed care has continued for
almost two decades. More than half the nation’s Medicaid
beneficiaries are now enrolled in a managed care plan.1
As defined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS, previously the Health Care Financing
Administration, or HCFA), that category includes com-
mercial health maintenance organizations (HMOs),
Medicaid-only HMOs, various prepaid arrangements
under state Medicaid waivers, and state-sponsored
primary care case management (PCCM) programs.
“Primary care case management” is an appellation
coined for Medicaid, describing a model that combines
features of fee-for-service and managed care. Today, 29
states have PCCM programs, which range from local
and voluntary, as in Utah, to Arkansas’s statewide
mandatory ConnectCare. In several states, PCCM is the
default enrollment for a beneficiary who fails to make
a choice of plan.
Many states have introduced PCCM in selected
counties before making it available statewide. Some
continue to offer PCCM as an alternative to one or
more managed care organizations (MCOs) in urban
areas, where the latter commonly operate, while PCCM
is the model of choice for rural areas, where a relative
scarcity of providers and a scattered population make a
risk-based approach infeasible. PCCM can also serve as
the vehicle to extend health insurance coverage to hard-
to-serve populations, such as Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) beneficiaries.
Typically, a PCCM program pays participating
primary care physicians (PCPs) a small monthly admin-
istrative fee to coordinate care for Medicaid patients.
The PCP must sign a contract with the state, agreeing to
certain conditions of participation, such as providing
access to a defined package of primary care services 24
hours a day, seven days a week. Medical services
provided by the PCP generally are reimbursed on a fee-
for-service basis rather than by capitation, as is common
in HMOs. Other responsibilities, such as participation
in quality improvement projects, are included in some
state PCCM contracts.
States have developed PCCM programs for a variety
of reasons. At a time when managed care was just emerg-
ing, PCCM was viewed as a way to bring some structure
and organization to the delivery system and begin to hold
providers accountable while still saving state dollars.2 As
time went on, some states viewed PCCM as a possible
transition between traditional fee-for-service and the new
exigencies of manage care organizations. Today, with
commercial MCOs exiting Medicaid in many markets,
PCCM is seen by some as a sequel rather than a precur-
sor, a method viable in its own right for maintaining a
Medicaid managed care delivery system.
A defining PCCM characteristic is that states
themselves are in charge. The state Medicaid agency
either administers PCCM or manages a contractor who
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does so. Administration entails responsibility for every-
thing from provider recruitment to patient education,
though a contract for independent evaluation is common.
This range of responsibilities can be a more demanding
prospect than awarding and monitoring an MCO contract
or paying claims in a traditional fee-for-service world.
State Medicaid executives are challenged to acquire the
skills of commercial health plan managers. However,
PCCM also offers managers an opportunity to tailor a
program to the state’s own population, culture, and public
health priorities. Further, PCCM provides an assurance of
continuity: unlike a for-profit MCO, a state agency cannot
consider leaving when a market turns unprofitable.
PCCM’s flexibility is demonstrated by its use in urban
and rural areas, in specific markets and across states, and
under voluntary and mandatory conditions. Its aims have
encompassed disease management, performance mea-
surement, and population health. As discussed below,
both patients and physicians express satisfaction with
PCCM participation. As federal and private-sector man-
agers seek ways to broaden access and improve quality in
a time when signals from commercial MCOs are mixed,
looking at the PCCM model may offer some insight.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
PCCM as an approach to Medicaid was enabled by an
amendment to Title XIX of the Social Security Act in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. Its Section
1915(b) created a means by which states could waive
statutory requirements that Medicaid programs offer
comparable benefits statewide and offer beneficiaries
freedom of choice in obtaining services. With an ap-
proved 1915(b) waiver, which was good for two years and
could be renewed, a state could mandate that beneficiaries
enroll in a managed care plan. It could also pilot-test plan
refinements in a single county or metropolitan area.
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) extended
further support to Medicaid managed care by permitting
states—without need of a waiver—to require that
beneficiaries enroll with managed care entities. Man-
aged care entities were defined to include both MCOs
and PCCM programs. Limitations were as follows:
 Mandatory enrollment could not be imposed on
children with special health care needs, children in
foster care, or certain Medicaid-eligible Medicare
beneficiaries.
 Native Americans and Alaskan natives could be
mandated to enroll only in an Indian health, urban
Indian, or tribal managed care entity.
 States were required to offer all beneficiaries a
choice of at least two plans or, under PCCM, at least
two PCPs.
The BBA specified that primary care case manage-
ment services (including “locating, coordinating, and
monitoring of health care services”) would be
Medicaid-covered services.3 A qualifying PCCM
program must make provision for 24-hour emergency
treatment, reasonable geographic availability of service
delivery sites, and a sufficient number of physicians to
serve the Medicaid population “promptly and without
compromise to quality of care.”
PCCM AND MANAGED RISK PLANS
Both legally recognized as managed care plans,
PCCM programs and MCOs often share significant
characteristics. Both comprise a panel of physicians and
charge one PCP with primary responsibility for each
patient. Both seek to structure incentives (to physicians
and patients) to encourage appropriate use of medical
services. Both can and typically do undertake utilization
review, patient education programs, and quality moni-
toring activities. Independent evaluations of PCCM
programs have recorded initial savings in the range of
5 to 15 percent compared to a similar fee-for-service
population, comparable to savings achieved by MCOs.4
PCCM programs may have been more fortunate in
their public image, in part because of terminology: a
“care coordinator” or even a “case manager” sounds
less forbidding than a “gatekeeper,” the pejorative label
MCOs have been saddled with. Another factor affecting
satisfaction is the history of enrollee populations. Many
Americans who were moved into managed care by their
employers found new restrictions irritating, whereas
many Medicaid beneficiaries entering PCCM have
found a stable relationship with a physician that had
previously been difficult to achieve. In fact, as Charles
Milligan—a former New Mexico Medicaid director
now with the Lewin Group— has observed, PCCM has
enjoyed a steady popularity with both patients and
primary care providers.
While specialists and enrollees sometimes were
unhappy with the arrangement, since enrollees
couldn’t just present for specialty care without a PCP
referral, you haven’t heard much discontent in the
provider or enrollee ranks about PCCM programs,
especially since no providers were considered “out of
network” and referrals generally weren’t second-
guessed. No entity really injected itself between
doctors and patients.5
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A major difference between a PCCM program and
an MCO, frequently, is the sharing of financial risk. In
accepting capitation from an MCO, providers assume
financial risk for the care of a patient population.
PCCM physicians, with fee-for-service reimbursement
supplemented by a management fee, do not take on
additional risk by virtue of their contracts. Some
physicians might argue that contracting with Medicaid
always entails some risk—the legislature may cut rates
again, for example—but a doctor who finds himself
with a sicker-than-average group of patients is not
disadvantaged under PCCM as in a risk contract. On
the other hand, a provider not at risk has less incentive
to keep a careful eye on costs.
What Milligan characterizes as “second-generation”
PCCM has moved beyond the simple gatekeeping fee,
drawing from the more sophisticated repertoire of com-
mercial managed care such enterprises as provider
credentialing, member surveys, and quality improvement
initiatives. In short, said Milligan, these programs have
come to “closely resemble risk-based managed care,”
with the state, rather than MCOs, controlling the overall
enterprise.”6 (It is interesting to note that a resemblance
grows from both directions: MCOs have become less
forceful in their oversight,




PCCM programs and MCOs
can have both positive and
negative ramifications. In a
market where both are feasi-
ble, competition can increase
beneficiary choice and moti-
vate both MCO and PCCM
programs to improve quality
and service. The existence of
a PCCM alternative can give
the state greater bargaining
leverage with the MCO, and
it serves as a place for bene-
ficiaries to go should an
MCO decide to leave the
state. However, the existence
of a PCCM program may
actually encourage MCO
withdrawal if the state is not
careful to apply access, qual-
ity, and reporting standards evenhandedly. Massachusetts
has taken this consideration to heart and rates its PCCM
program along with MCOs in the state according to the
standardized performance measures derived from the
National Committee on Quality Assurance’s Health Plan
Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS). Indeed,
Massachusetts regards the PCCM program as a state-
managed HMO, not a fancier version of fee-for-service.7
PCCM DESIGN
A state may have one or more objectives in estab-
lishing a PCCM program, such as increasing access,
holding providers more accountable, establishing state
control over medical quality, replacing exiting MCOs,
or responding to the “managed care backlash.” Obvi-
ously, the objective will drive program development.
But states that have successful PCCM programs, and
their evaluators, agree on certain key considerations:
state resources, capabilities, and culture; provider
involvement; reimbursement and funding; and benefi-
ciary involvement.
State Resources, Capabilities, and Culture
As researchers Jim Verdier and Cheryl Young put it
in a report on what works and what does not in man-
aged care purchasing,
“States should not design
programs they cannot ad-
minister.”8 This seems self-
evident, but the authors go
on to explain,
If states are consider-
ing programs that
could require collec-
tion and analysis of








have or can obtain the
necessary resources




Some state agencies rely en-
tirely on their own person-
nel. By contrast, Texas em-
ploys Birch & Davis, a private contractor, to administer
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very specific functions, such as provider training. North
Carolina relies on county-based personnel for many
patient- and provider-relations functions.
Some states that ventured into PCCM chose to
regard it as a stepping-stone. Michigan, which in 1982
became the first state to implement PCCM, dismantled
its program in 1997 in favor of contracting with com-
petitive MCOs. New Mexico, citing a 23 percent
increase in the previous fiscal year’s Medicaid costs,
made a similar decision the same year.9
By contrast, other states that did not join the initial
PCCM foray are finding that the idea has promise
almost two decades later. For example, Ohio is looking
at standard PCCM and a disease management version
to improve service to its Medicaid clients, especially in
the absence of HMO competition in some areas of the
state.10 Nevada and Idaho are looking at expanding
PCCM into rural counties
as a replacement of the cur-
rent fee-for-service arrange-
ment. Indiana and Washing-
ton are exploring the use of
care coordination and case
management in the SSI
population. Several states
are considering how PCCM
could improve service to
people eligible for both
Medicare and Medicaid.11
Overall, says Nikki
Highsmith of the Center for
Health Care Strategies,
states are applying value-
based purchasing tools to
PCCM programs and are
achieving better access and
quality than Medicaid fee-
for-service as a result. Link-
ing overall programmatic
goals with appropriate phy-
sician incentives is also a key to a state's success.
Provider Involvement
Provider buy-in to PCCM from its inception is cer-
tainly a boon to program management. Some states made
considerable effort to involve physicians from the begin-
ning of the design phase. Texas held public meetings
around the state to solicit provider input. North Carolina’s
Access II and III refinements of its basic Access I PCCM
program are described by the state as “provider-driven,”
and physicians were asked to develop their own best
practices and quality improvement measures. Massachu-
setts government has a tradition of working closely with
providers; the state’s effort to include groups such as the
Massachusetts Medical Society and the League of County
Health Centers in program design and provider recruit-
ment has “paid off again and again,” says a former PCCM
program director.12 Several states have formed physician
councils to serve as advisors on policy and provider
concerns.
States have invested significantly in provider rela-
tions staff and programs. As the authors of a National
Academy for State Health Policy review of state pro-
grams observed,
Since PCCM success relies on having a sufficient
number of primary care providers to coordinate
beneficiary access to appropriate care, provider
recruitment becomes more of an issue for the state
than under either fee-for-
service Medicaid where
the beneficiary is responsi-
ble for finding his or her
own provider, or under an
HMO model where the
HMO takes responsibility
for provider recruitment.13
States encourage both pro-
viders and enrollees to
spread the word. Some
states, such as Maine, use
outside contractors for re-
cruiting. Beyond recruiting




each PCP twice a year, es-
tablishing a relationship and
serving as a liaison to the
state’s Department of Hu-
man Services. The depart-
ment, working with Elec-
tronic Data Systems, Inc., developed an automated
eligibility verification and claims submission system for
physicians in 1992. This provides online eligibility and
utilization data on beneficiaries and allows online
billing for Medicaid claims. Its popularity in part
accounts for the state’s proud claim that enrolled
physicians represent the capacity to serve four times the
existing caseload.14
Oklahoma conducts regional forums to address the
questions and concerns of its participating providers.
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line for enrollees and, where nurses are empowered to
make specialist and hospital referrals, allow this to
serve as partial fulfillment of the 24-hour access re-
quirement imposed on PCPs.
Educational programs also play a role in provider
relations. States may disseminate best practices associ-
ated with certain diseases or conditions, make available
Web-based instructional modules, or draw physicians’
attention to new research. This offers an opportunity to
emphasize state health priorities; for example, educa-
tional communications to providers may dwell heavily
on AIDS, diabetes, or asthma, depending on what the
state has chosen to measure.
Feedback to providers is seen as a critical support in
many states. Provider profiling shows a physician how
his practice patterns compare to those of peers in his
region or statewide. An enhancement can tell the PCP
things about his patients he might otherwise not have
known. For example, Alabama actively encourages
emergency room physicians to contact a patient’s PCP,
and North Carolina includes emergency room use in
quarterly reports on patient utilization of services
prepared for PCPs.
Reimbursement and Funding
It is not surprising that reimbursement plays a
significant role in providers’ enthusiasm and loyalty.
Nor is it surprising that providers, wherever located, are
virtually unanimous in finding Medicaid rates too low.
But some states have been able to address provider as
well as budgetary concerns in their reimbursement
design—and to further population-health goals as well.
The original PCCM concept incorporated a case
management fee of $3.00 per member per month
(PMPM) paid to the PCP in compensation for the
additional duties of care coordination, such as making
referrals and reviewing overall care.15 The $3.00, a
capitated amount that is paid regardless of whether any
service is provided that month, is a de facto increase in
Medicaid reimbursement. Depending on how many
Medicaid patients enrolled with the primary care
provider, the aggregate PMPM payments might or
might not represent a significant motivator. Some
skeptics have questioned what kind of quality enhance-
ment a state could really expect for $3.00.
As PCCM programs evolved and state managers
studied MCO practices to learn the techniques of
managed care, some state agencies have gone beyond
the basic fee approach. Massachusetts abandoned the
$3.00 standard. Instead, to encourage the provision of
certain specified primary care services, the primary care
clinician receives an “enhanced” payment of $10.00
when such services are provided to a Medicaid enrollee.
Oklahoma has adopted partial capitation for primary
care, paying a set amount for basic office visits (such as
well-child care) and an enhanced payment for
Medicaid’s EPSDT (Early and Periodic Screening,
Diagnostic, and Treatment) service for children. In
Maine, PCPs receive a PMPM payment and also
participate in a bonus pool that is distributed annually
based on a composite measure of the physician’s
Medicaid caseload, emergency room use, and prede-
fined prevention and quality goals.
The level of provider reimbursement is not the only
issue: timeliness and accuracy are also important. A
state without an excellent claims payment system, notes
PCCM expert Vernon Smith, is going to have difficulty
administering a PCCM program—and keeping provid-
ers.16 Massachusetts urges its providers to do their
part—“If you do not verify a member’s eligibility
before providing services, you might not be paid for
those services”—and makes available a verification
system to make it easy.
Beneficiary Involvement
Identifying and enrolling eligible beneficiaries
presents the same basic challenges for a PCCM pro-
gram as it does for other Medicaid and SCHIP plans.
That is, get the word out, go where the potential clients
are likely to be, and anticipate communications difficul-
ties from illiteracy to not speaking English to distrust of
giving information to “the government.”
Many states have chosen to contract with enrollment
brokers to assist beneficiaries in making plan and/or
provider decisions; others have allocated staff positions
to this activity. In 1997, 37 of the 40 states offering
managed care plan choice had established some form of
enrollment counseling.17 Member hotlines are a com-
mon service. For example, Arkansas offers a 24-hour
help line to answer questions about enrolling with a
PCP or changing enrollment as well as to address
beneficiary complaints.
Program design decisions—such as whether PCCM
enrollment will be voluntary or mandatory and whether
that will vary based on where a person lives—have
framed communications issues in some states. Some
studies have shown a trend toward voluntary PCCM
enrollment. For example, the Maternal and Child Health
Policy Research Center reported that, for children
receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
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benefits or eligible for Medicaid because of poverty, 19
percent of PCCM states had a voluntary enrollment
policy in effect in at least some part of the state in 1996,
while 34 percent did so in 1999.18 On the other hand,
the BBA provision eliminating the need for a 1915(b)
waiver also prompted, or at least enabled, several states
to promulgate mandatory managed-care enrollment.
Voluntary enrollment by definition entails a choice
of whether to participate. Even where enrollment is
mandatory, beneficiaries are called upon to make
decisions, such as choosing a PCP. In Indiana, choice
of provider in fact drives choice of plan; beneficiaries
are enrolled in an HMO or the PCCM program accord-
ing to their chosen physician’s affiliation.
It may happen that a beneficiary desires to sign up
with a PCP not currently participating in a state’s
managed care program. Some PCCM programs make
considerable effort to accommodate these wishes. For
example, area office staff in Florida will visit a nonpar-
ticipating PCP requested by a beneficiary to see whether
that physician can be persuaded to enroll, even if only to
treat that single beneficiary.19 When an Arkansas
beneficiary without a PCP appears in the emergency
room for nonemergent care, emergency room staff are
permitted to assist the patient in selecting a PCP; for this
service, the state pays a small fee and allows the emer-
gency room to bill Medicaid for the care provided.
After enrollment, states have developed incen-
tives—such as points or coupons that mothers earn for
a well-child visit or immunization, redeemable for
diapers, clothing, or gasoline—to encourage members to
see their PCPs to receive preventive services. There may
also be procedures to discourage inappropriate behavior;
for example, Maine’s quality management nurses send
letters to PCCM members who have visited the emer-
gency room for common ailments such as coughs and
colds, advising them to see their PCPs instead.20
EXPANDING THE MODEL
Disease Management
As state officials have grown comfortable with the
evolution from claims-payer to active plan administrator
that PCCM entails, they have considered ways to expand
the model’s reach. For example, PCCM has been recog-
nized as a model that particularly improves quality of care
for persons who need assistance navigating the medical
care system, prompting state Medicaid programs to
include more population groups in PCCM over time.21
These may include the disabled, children with special
health care needs, even the institutionalized.
In Florida, where approximately half of Medicaid
recipients were covered under the PCCM program,
MediPass, the legislature in 1997 authorized the estab-
lishment of a chronic disease management (CDM)
program. The Agency for Health Care Administration
(AHCA) determined that approximately 19 percent of
MediPass enrollees met the criteria for CDM.22 AHCA
sought bids from disease-management vendors to
provide service for MediPass members with specified
high-cost, high-prevalence conditions for which clinical
treatment patterns had been observed to vary. Initially,
these were HIV/AIDS, diabetes, asthma, congestive
heart failure, and hemophilia; the legislature subse-
quently added end-stage renal disease, cancer, sickle-
cell anemia, and hypertension.
An evaluation of the program by researchers from
Medimetrix and the Center for Health Care Strategies
found that CDM offers states new tools for integrating
and managing costly care, particularly where HMOs are
withdrawing from Medicaid. The evaluators note that,
Disease management strategies move away from typical
demand management (e.g., utilization review and prior
authorization) toward [a focus] on provider and member
support and education about how to appropriately
manage, treat, and live with chronic illness.23
A question about the CDM program is its reliance
on disease-specific vendors, which seems to presuppose
that patients have a single diagnosis. This is not neces-
sarily the case among the chronically ill; indeed,
multiple and interdependent conditions are the norm in
some populations, such as the elderly. To serve such
beneficiaries well, the agency needs to assure that
communication occurs, for example, that the disease
management firm treating hypertension coordinates its
services with the PCP treating headaches or the special-
ist treating macular degeneration.
Case management programs utilizing nonphysician
care managers (often nurses) are fairly common in the
private sector; many insurers, third-party administrators,
and even large employers have adopted case manage-
ment as a means to manage catastrophically expensive
cases and, increasingly, to identify and intervene in
cases that have the potential to become complicated and
expensive. The goal here is to coordinate all care a
patient needs and receives. States could follow this
example—as some have begun to do—either employing
their own case managers or contracting for this service.
It should be noted that preventive case management,
 8 
that is, analyzing a population to identify potentially at-
risk cases, requires a sophisticated information system
and access to timely and accurate data.
A strength of the PCCM model is its assurance of
case management. As with any Medicaid program,
however, a challenge for PCCM as a disease manage-
ment model is that Medicaid eligibility is not necessarily
stable. If a beneficiary goes in and out of eligible status
and employment and family circumstances change,
tracking his or her condition and quality of care over
time could easily by disrupted. It is possible for a state
to address this with a policy of continuous guaranteed
eligibility for a specified period of time, such as a year.
Quality Partnerships
Taking a leaf from the private-sector notebook, state
managers learned to pay attention to their contracted
MCOs’ scores on standard-
ized quality measures such
as HEDIS and patient satis-
faction instruments such as
the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality’s con-
sumer assessment of health
plan’s survey, or CAHPs. It
was not then a huge stretch
to apply the same standards
to their PCCM programs.
Here again, state officials
saw an opportunity to ad-
vance health goals appropri-
ate to their populations by
emphasizing certain mea-
sures and looking for steady
improvement rather than per-
formance to a national norm.
North Carolina’s refine-
ment of basic PCCM was
directed toward providers.
State officials cite “the on-
going challenge” of structuring incentives for physi-
cians that do not require greater expenditure.24 One
way, they thought, was to increase PCPs’ sense of own-
ership of the program by decentralizing, promoting sup-
port and feedback while deemphasizing edicts, and
giving doctors tools that would make provider groups
a real alternative to MCOs.
Access I, basic PCCM, was rolled out to all counties
beginning in 1991. Under Access II, implemented in six
counties beginning in 1997, beneficiaries enroll with a
group practice that has a previously approved plan for
managing a Medicaid population. The state adds a
supplemental $2.50 PMPM to help finance information
systems and quality improvement projects. Access III,
piloted in 1999, allows a physician group to manage an
entire county’s Medicaid caseload, working with county
agencies to address various human services issues that
affect population health. Access III currently operates
in two counties.
BEYOND MEDICAID?
State Medicaid directors can point to successes in
using PCCM to address the challenges of delivering
health care to populations such as the disabled and the
elderly. Not all the disabled and elderly are Medicaid
beneficiaries, of course. It seems only logical to ask if
PCCM could prove a fruitful approach for Medicare.
This is not a new ques-
tion. The National Academy
of Social Insurance’s 1998
report From a Generation
Behind to a Generation
Ahead: Transforming Tradi-
tional Medicare suggested
that case management held
promise for both the cost and
quality of care given to fee-
for-service Medicare benefi-
ciaries. The Clinton adminis-
tration plan for Medicare
reform first announced in
June 1999 called for the im-
plementation of a voluntary
PCCM alternative for fee-
for-service beneficiaries. A
bill introduced in the 107th
Congress by Sens. Blanche
Lincoln (D-Ark.) and Harry
Reid (D-Nev.) would autho-
rize Medicare coverage of
assessment and care coordination services provided by
physicians to qualified frail elderly and those at risk of
institutionalization, functional decline, or death.25
Within CMS, investigation of this concept is pro-
ceeding in small stages. Maine’s pilot MaineNET
program for beneficiaries dually eligible for Medicare
and Medicaid aims to coordinate primary, acute, and
long-term care services. In addition to signing up with
a PCP, each beneficiary is assigned a “care partner”
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services as well as assisting the beneficiary in choosing
and managing long-term care services. Other states are
also considering a PCCM approach to serving dual
eligibles; they are concerned, however, that current law
(or its current interpretation) prohibits them from
requiring case management—perceived as a restric-
tion—on Medicare beneficiaries under fee-for-service.
The BBA authorized a case demonstration in
Medicare, and HCFA in January 2001 announced the
selection of 15 sites for a pilot project designed to test
“whether paying for coordinated care services for
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries with complex
chronic conditions can yield better patient outcomes
without increasing program costs.”26 The sites, hospitals
and other medical centers, each submitted a proposal
detailing a specific chronic care program—for condi-
tions such as congestive heart failure or cancer—that
could benefit Medicare patients. This is thus a disease
management rather than a full PCCM foray.
In preparation for the demonstration, HCFA com-
missioned a study of best practices in managed care.
The resulting report suggested that a coordinated care
program (whether focused on overall case management
or more specific disease management) should
serve chronically ill persons at risk for adverse out-
comes and expensive care . . . by (1) identifying those
medical, functional, social, and emotional needs that
increase their risk of adverse health events; (2) address-
ing those needs through education in self-care, optimi-
zation of medical treatment, and integration of care
fragmented by setting or provider; and (3) monitoring
patients for progress and early signs of problems.27
The authors concluded that a demonstration of a coordi-
nated care approach in fee-for-service Medicare was
feasible and appeared to have a reasonable chance of
being cost-effective.
Examples of programs selected are QMED of
McLean, Virginia, which will target cancer, and
CorSolutions of Buffalo Grove, Illinois, which will
focus on congestive heart failure. Pilot projects are
being implemented on a rolling basis; each receives
funding for four years and will be formally evaluated
every two years. If the agency’s evaluators find that the
projects are indeed cost-effective and that quality of
care and satisfaction are improved, the effective pro-
jects (or the effective aspects thereof) may be contin-
ued. The number of sites may be expanded.28
To think about making PCCM a wholesale approach
to fee-for-service Medicare naturally raises knottier
policy questions than a demonstration does. One of the
first is the issue of provider contracting. Medicare fee-
for-service is in essence an any-willing-provider system,
wherein a physician willing to accept Medicare’s fee
schedule is accepted as a participant. PCCM may
impose more obligations on a PCP, raising the possibil-
ity of physician opposition.
As discussed above, many Medicare beneficiaries
are chronically ill, suffering multiple illnesses. Coordi-
nating care for a patient in this category may require
more time and effort than a PCP is willing to expend in
exchange for a modest administrative fee. It may be that
a form of case management that targets high-cost cases
and utilizes professionals hired as case managers rather
than practicing physicians will prove more suited to
Medicare.
The idea has been raised that Medicare could con-
tract with states to provide services to Medicare benefi-
ciaries via existing PCCM programs. This would be a
departure from the established practice of each pro-
gram’s independent purchasing but may be worthy of
investigation—particularly at a time when the future
participation of MCOs in Medicare+ Choice is in some
doubt. An issue that would need to be resolved is the
differences that currently exist in Medicaid-covered
benefits from one state to another, which may exceed the
regional differences in what is covered under Medicare.
Proponents praise PCCM as a model that gives the
Medicaid beneficiary a medical home, encouraging a
relationship with a particular physician who can coordi-
nate care. Physicians, they say, like it for its sense of
partnership and lack of risk, and patients like it because
it offers choice. It can be effective in rural as well as
urban settings. Finally, it provides structure and organi-
zation to the delivery system that supports quality
improvement and accountability.
Not all of these claims would carry over to Medicare,
which would face operational and public-relations
challenges in modifying its basic fee-for-service premise
—notably, that beneficiaries have had and always will
have free choice of provider. PCPs are likely to find the
demands that complex cases can impose more prevalent.
Nevertheless, as policymakers question whether an
uncontrolled fee-for-service model can survive the
demands of the baby boomers, those who have experience
with PCCM programs suggest that it may be provident to
look to that model’s strengths.
THE FORUM SESSION
The session for which this issue brief serves as
background will examine the development of the
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PCCM model and various adaptations currently operat-
ing. Vernon Smith, Ph.D., will give an overview of his
extensive research into PCCM program operations.
Smith is a principal with Health Management Associ-
ates and previously served as Medicaid director for the
State of Michigan.
Representatives of two state PCCM programs—L.
Allen Dobson Jr., M.D., from North Carolina and
Rebecca Pasternik-Ikard from Oklahoma—will
describe how these programs are tailored to further state
policy goals. Dobson, a family physician, is president of
Cabarrus Family Medicine and serves as medical
director of ACCESS II and III. Pasternik-Ikard is
director of the SoonerCare program and care manage-
ment services for the Oklahoma Health Care Authority.
Christine Nye, senior vice president, Medicare and
Medicaid development, for Schaller Anderson, Inc., and
former director of the HCFA Medicaid Bureau and the
Wisconsin Medicaid program, will talk about extending
the PCCM model beyond the Medicaid population.
Robert Berenson, M.D., former director of HCFA’s
Center for Health Plans and Providers and now senior
advisor at the Academy for Health Services Research
and Health Policy, will offer his comments on PCCM
and Medicare.
Questions to be addressed include the following:
 What has prompted states to adopt the primary care
case management model for their Medicaid popula-
tions? How has the model been refined over time to
serve particular state policy goals?
 How does a PCCM approach differ from contracting
with MCOs?
 Does PCCM furnish additional access by attracting
more physicians as Medicaid providers than fee-for-
service or managed risk? If so, why? What do
physicians see as the model’s strengths and weak-
nesses? Do specialists have a view different from
that of primary care practitioners?
 How does PCCM foster provider accountability?
 Are primary care physicians the most appropriate
case managers? What assistance might they need in
managing complex cases?
 How has PCCM been modified to support disease
management programs? How has it been expanded
to include special-needs populations?
 What elements of PCCM might work to the benefit
of the Medicare program? What legislative or
regulatory changes would be necessary?
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